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Bootstrapping a Civilization (Part 2): What's gone and what remains

Pandemic, blackout, war, or volcanic winter: the cause decides what kills in the first few days. For rebuilding, what counts is what's left: people, things, raw materials, a habitable environment. Plus the assumptions this series works with.

A raccoon in round glasses stands upright with a blank clipboard between dusty shelves overgrown with plants and full of tools, jugs, and coils of rope.
$ make world
==> Stage 0: The collapse
==> Building target: scenarios
    needs: (none)

Pop culture loves the question of how the world ends. Zombies, an asteroid, a killer virus, a machine uprising—at the movies, the apocalypse is mostly a spectacle.

For this series, the cause is important in two ways. It decides what kills you in the first few days. And it determines what's still there afterward. The second is more important for the tech tree, but without the first, nobody gets that far.

Four ways to lose a civilization

Pandemic: the people are missing

Between 1347 and 1351, the Black Death killed an estimated one third to one half of Europe's population, and considerably more in some regions. The material world didn't disappear to the same degree: houses, fields, tools, and livestock were still there. What was missing were the people who used them.

What's interesting is what didn't happen afterward. Europe forgot neither smithing nor farming. Basic techniques survived even a population loss of that magnitude.

Whether the same holds for a modern industrial society is less certain. Our knowledge is better documented than in the Middle Ages, but much of it sits in highly specialized professions and complex organizations. Milking a cow or framing a roof is a different thing from keeping a semiconductor fab running. Not every village has someone who knows how to expose a wafer.

Infrastructure failure: everything's there, nothing works

In 2011, the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (TAB) looked at what a large-scale, prolonged power outage would do to Germany. The summary is unusually blunt: all critical infrastructures would be affected, and “it would be almost impossible to prevent a collapse of society as a whole”.

Plenty of things can trigger one: technical failure, an attack, extreme weather, or a severe geomagnetic storm.

The Carrington Event of 1859 was one of the strongest geomagnetic storms on record. The currents in telegraph lines got so strong that equipment failed, operators got electric shocks, and a few fires broke out.

A comparable storm today would hit a completely different infrastructure. Geomagnetically induced currents can damage high-voltage transformers. Large grid transformers in particular aren't a part you pull out of the warehouse the next morning: they're often custom-built, hard to transport, and have procurement lead times of a year or more.

That doesn't automatically make a solar storm the end of the world. How hard a grid gets hit depends on its topology, its transformers, and the geology under the lines, among other things. As an example of a problem with long repair times, though, it works very well.

The truly treacherous part of an infrastructure failure: at first, people, buildings, and machines are mostly still there, but they no longer work as a system. Without power, the pumps at gas stations stop, telecommunications drop out bit by bit, and even the water supply can only be kept running to a limited extent. Depending on the infrastructure, batteries, emergency power, and existing reserves last only hours to a few days, according to the TAB report.

At the same time, a great many people are still competing for the same supplies.

War: fewer people, fewer things

War destroys both, and preferably where people and infrastructure are packed closely together. A nuclear war adds radioactive fallout.

For fresh fallout after a nuclear explosion, there's a useful rule of thumb. According to the 7-10 rule, the dose rate drops to about a tenth for every sevenfold increase in the time elapsed.

If you take the dose rate one hour after the explosion as the baseline, it's down to about a tenth after seven hours and to a hundredth after 49 hours. After 343 hours, a little over two weeks, it's at about a thousandth.

That's a rule of thumb, not a Geiger counter. It says nothing about how much fallout has landed at a given spot in the first place, and it doesn't replace measuring. But it shows why shelter in the first hours and days makes such a difference: fresh fallout loses dose rate very quickly at first.

After that, the problem hasn't simply disappeared. Fallout also contains longer-lived radionuclides. Cesium-137, for example, has a half-life of 30.17 years.

That doesn't mean every affected area is uninhabitable for 30 years, though. The deciding factors are the amount and composition of the fallout, local deposition, the soil, land use, and possible decontamination. Some places can become usable again quickly; others stay a poor choice for rebuilding for a long time.

Environmental shock: the harvest fails

In April 1815, Mount Tambora erupted on the Indonesian island of Sumbawa. Material from the eruption reached the stratosphere and affected the climate far beyond Indonesia. Especially in parts of Europe and North America, 1816 became the “Year Without a Summer”: unusual cold, crop failures, and food shortages.

A volcanic winter, a large asteroid impact, and a nuclear winter differ considerably in cause and scale. For our tech tree, though, they have one thing in common. People, tools, and buildings can initially be largely intact, while the very foundation of any longer-term food supply can give way: agriculture.

In practice: cascades

Clean, single-cause scenarios mostly exist in the movies.

A severe pandemic costs staff at power plants, waterworks, and hospitals. A power outage shuts down pumps and communications. Missing transport turns a local problem into a supply problem. At some point, the shortage itself creates new conflicts.

That's exactly why the TAB report on power outages is so sobering: critical infrastructures depend on each other. If one of them is down long enough, it rarely stays the only one.

What's left afterward

For rebuilding, the whole thing breaks down into four axes.

People. How many are still around, and what can they do?

According to Lewis Dartnell, a functioning society needs thousands or tens of thousands of people, not a dozen survivors.

How much the size of an isolated group decides which technology it can keep up over the long run is disputed, however.

In 2004, Joseph Henrich tried to explain this using Tasmania as an example. His thesis: after the separation from the Australian mainland, the circle of people learning from each other shrank so much that certain skills were no longer passed on reliably. He used this to explain the presumed loss or simplification of various technologies (Henrich 2004).

That claim has since drawn pointed criticism. Later work disputes both that population size adequately explains the observed change and parts of the underlying archaeological interpretation. For some supposedly lost technologies, the evidence is considerably weaker than the well-known story of the “Tasmanian effect” suggests (Vaesen et al. 2016).

For this series, a more cautious statement is enough: a small group has fewer specialists, fewer options for dividing up work, and less redundancy. Knowledge that only one person has disappears with that person.

Things. Buildings, tools, vehicles, books, spare parts, medicines, and supplies. That's the grace period, which part 6planned covers in detail.

How long it lasts depends heavily on the scenario. After a severe pandemic, a great deal of material infrastructure would initially still be there. After a large-scale war, the exact opposite can be true. And even an undamaged vehicle is only useful as long as fuel, tires, batteries, and spare parts hold out.

Raw materials. This is where the second run at industrialization gets interesting.

Lewis Dartnell argues that a newly emerging industry couldn't simply count on the same easily accessible oil deposits that were tapped the first time around. A large share has long since been exploited. Many of the remaining ones require technology that a fresh start like that doesn't have yet.

Coal is a different story in some regions. There are still near-surface deposits that could be reached by open-pit mining. So the exact starting point depends heavily on where our group lives.

With metals, we have an advantage the first industrialization didn't have: centuries of industrial production have brought enormous amounts of already mined metal to the surface.

Steel beams, rails, pipes, cables, machines, and vehicles don't vanish because society collapses. Even badly corroded metal can become raw material again. Dartnell compares such stocks, roughly speaking, to a very rich ore.

So an abandoned city isn't just a ruin. It's also a stockpile of raw materials.

Environment. Can you live, grow food, and produce things in one place over the long term?

After a pandemic, the environment is probably largely unchanged. After a volcanic winter, farming can get considerably harder for years. Radioactive fallout, in turn, doesn't spread evenly: one place can be heavily contaminated while a few kilometers away the situation is completely different.

For rebuilding, then, what counts isn't just what exists somewhere, but what can be used at a specific site.

The matrix

Scenario People Things Environment What dominates Stage 0
Pandemic heavily decimated largely intact, decays slowly mostly intact contagion, supply without staff
Infrastructure failure initially largely still there intact, but systems fail intact water, hygiene, supply
War decimated partly destroyed locally contaminated or destroyed injuries, violence, fallout in a nuclear war
Environmental shock initially largely still there mostly intact agriculture badly disrupted food, cold, choice of site

This leads to something important for the whole series: Stage 0 looks completely different depending on the scenario. The basic building blocks of the tech tree after it change surprisingly little.

Sooner or later, someone has to provide water, produce food, make tools, build, heat, and work metal. The scenario mainly decides how many people are around to do it, which leftovers help, and which detours become necessary.

The assumptions behind this series

A blueprint needs boundary conditions. For the main path, these apply:

  • A small group that can grow. We start with dozens, not thousands. That makes the full path to a self-built computer more of a multi-generation project. We don't pretend that twenty people could build up, in ten years, a complete industrial base all the way to computing on top of food, houses, and farming.
  • Central Europe, temperate climate. Plants, soils, raw materials, and weather are based on that. Where today's law plays a role, we mainly look at Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Elsewhere, both points need adjusting.
  • A habitable environment. Without one, there's nothing to build, only something to survive.
  • Leftovers at the start, but not for good. They may shorten any step. The main path eventually works without them, too.
  • The knowledge in this series. With one small caveat: a blog is available exactly as long as the technology it's stored on. If you're saving this for the end of the world, you might want to do more than set a browser bookmark.

Outlook

With the matrix in mind, part 3planned tackles the first hours. The Rule of 3 from “Die Smart” still applies, but some priorities suddenly look different.

“Air” means something different in a city without a working fire department than in the wilderness. Water from the tap can only be taken for granted as long as pumps, treatment, and pressure work. And some things that were harmless infrastructure yesterday become a hazard of their own once nobody is monitoring them.

If you missed part 1: it explains what this series is about.


Disclaimer: This series covers basic knowledge for a hypothetical collapse and is no substitute for training, professionals, doctors or emergency services. Many of the techniques described are dangerous, and some require a permit or are banned today; check the legal situation. In a real emergency, call for help (112 in the EU). If there's a warning about a radiological hazard, follow the authorities' instructions.

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